Evidence: Admissability of Evidence and the Competency of Witnesses in Federal Courts by Powell, Edmund
Marquette Law Review
Volume 31
Issue 2 September 1947 Article 9
Evidence: Admissability of Evidence and the
Competency of Witnesses in Federal Courts
Edmund Powell
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Edmund Powell, Evidence: Admissability of Evidence and the Competency of Witnesses in Federal Courts, 31 Marq. L. Rev. 167 (1947).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol31/iss2/9
19471
EVIDENCE: EFFECT OF ERIE RAILWAY CO. vs. TOMPKINS ON
THE ADMISSABILITY OF EVIDENCE AND THE COMPE-
TENCY OF WITNESSES IN FEDERAL COURTS
In Erie Railway Co. v. Tompkins" it was decided that section 34
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 17892 which provides "The laws of
the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes
of the United States otherwise provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States,
in cases where they apply," was applicable to the decisional law of
the states as well as to state statutory law. The case held in effect that
the Federal Government whether acting through Congress or the
federal courts is powerless to create any substantive law binding on
the states unless the Constitution authorizes federal legislation in that
field. A federal court then, acting in cases where it acquires juris-
diction by virtue of diversity of citizenship rather than by virtue of
a federal question must apply the substantive lawv of the state wherein
the cause of action arises.
This decision is limited to substantive law, however. That the
Federal Government has the sole power to determine the procedure
to be applied in the federal courts has been recognizd since the case
of Wayman v. Southard.3 Erie Railway Co. v. Tompkins,4 since it
it is limited to substantive law, has not disturbed that principle.5
It should be noted that federal power over federal procedure includes
both cases where jurisdiction is obtained because federal questions
are involved and where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.
The Tompkins case was decided partially on Constitutional grounds.
The Court held that it would be unconstitutional for the federal courts
or Congress to impose rules of substantive law binding on states in
instances not specifically authorized by the Constitution. The practise
of the federal courts in the past under Swift v Tysone was an uncon-
stitutional invasion of rights reserved to the states. Accepting this
argument of the Court, then the question of the Tompkins case on the
admissability of evidence or on federal procedure in general is basic-
ally a Constitutional question.
This conclusion may be established by pointing to the fact that
Congress is free to change its statutes (including the Judiciary Act)
'304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 Now 28 U.S.C.A. section 725.
3 10 Wheaton 1 (1825).4 Supra note (1).
5 The language of Justice Reed in his concurring opinion in Erie Railway v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 at page 92 may be cited as authority for this statement as
well as Bixby v. Chris Craft: 7 F.R.D. 80 (1946); Franzen v. Du Pont De
Nemours Co. 51 Fed. Supp. 578 (1943); and the following articles: 1F.R.D.
417 at page 418 (1940) ; and 51 Yale Law Journal 763 at page 776 (1942).6 16 Pet. 1 (1842).
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as it desires. Congress has in fact (through the agency of the Supreme
Court) enacted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure7 and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to be the present law governing pro-
cedure (including the rules governing the admissability of evidence
and competency of witnesses) in federal courts. Even though the
language of the statute interpreted in the Tompkins case 9 had been
held to include procedural matters, the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 0 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure"
changed this statutory law and imposed definite federal rules of pro-
cedure. Since Congress can and has changed its statute, the sole
question then arising is has Congress in enacting the new statutes ex-
ceeded the Constitutional limit on its authority brought out by the
Tompkins case - namely that in cases where federal courts acquire
jurisdiction by virtue of diversity of citizenship, they must apply state
substantive law.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 embody the present rules
governing civil procedure in federal courts. They were formulated
by the Supreme Court prior to its decision in the Tompkins case;
consequently the effect of this case was not considered while these
rules were being formulated. These rules are labeled "Rules of Pro-
cedure". However, the line between procedure and substance is closely
drawn and often is indiscernable. The power of the Federal Govern-
ment to determine what law shall be applied in the federal courts
in diversity of citizenship cases is limited solely to procedural law.
It becomes necessary then in passing on the validity of these rules
to appraise each rule and to determine whether it is procedural or if
it is of such a nature as to be classified as substantive.
Charles E. Clark, United States Circuit Court Judge, in an article
on the effect of the Tompkins case on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, s points out that it is impossible to separate procedure from
substance in every instance and for this reason suggests that some
aspects of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 will fail because they
embody elements of substantive law. As an example of the hazy
line between substance and procedure it may be noted there is a differ-
ence of opinion as to whether a rule placing the burden of proof of
contributory negligence is substantive or procedural. Judge Clark
suggests as an approach toward the problem that each case should be
considered on its facts in determining whether a given rule invades
7 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723(c) (1938).
8 18 U.S.C.A. following section 687 (1946).
928 U.S.C.A. section 725.
10 Supra note (7).
1 Supra note (8).
12 Supra note (7).
13 1F.R.D. 417 (1940).
24 Supra note (7).
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the field of substantive law or is within the realm of procedure. Our
inquiry, however, does not include all of the new federal rules but
is limited solely to the effect of the Tompkins case on the admissability
of evidence and competency of witnesses.
It is to be noted that the Constitutional question raised by the
Tompkins case and discussed above is present only in cases where
the federal courts are bound by the Constitution to apply the sub-
stantive law of the states in settling the issues, before them. It can he
readily seen that in cases where the Federal Government is authorized
by the Constitution to apply its own substantive law it may apply
its procedural law without the problem of the Tompkins case arising.
For convenience I have spoken of and will continue to speak of the
type of cases where state substantive law must be applied by the
federal courts as diversity of citizenship cases.
It is difficult to visualize how the rules governing admissability of
evidence and competency of witnesses can have substantive elements
so as to violate the Constitutional prohibition enunciated in the Tomp-
kins case. However, an examination of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 5 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6 is ad-
visable to see what problems may be raised.
Section 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7 deals with
the admissability of evidence and competency of witnesses. This sec-
tion provides three standards for the admissability of evidence and
competency of witnesses, namely: (1) the statutes of the United States
(2) the rules of evidence "heretofore applied" in United States courts
hearing suits in equity (3) the rules of evidence applicable in courts
of general jurisdiction of the state wherein the United States court
is held. The standard which admits the evidence is the one that governs.
If the Constitutional problem raised in the Tompkins case is at all
applicable to the question of the admissability of evidence or com-
petency of witnesses, the problem is somewhat relieved by the in-
sertion of the third standard in section 43(a). The Constitutional
question is still present, however, when the state rules of evidence
excludes a matter but that same matter is admissable under either
of the first two standards. The problem is also present if the federal
court sits in a state different from the one wherein the cause of action
arose. In any event the problem ultimately revolves around the question
of whether the rule of evidence involved is one purely procedural in
nature or whether it is substantive in nature.
In Franzen v Du Pont De Nemours,m3 the court admitted evidence
that was not admissable under the rules of evidence of the state
15 Supra note (7).
16 Supra note (8).
: Supra note (7).
18 51 Fed. Supp. 578, affirmed in 146 Fed. 2d 837 (1944).
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where the United States court sat but which was admissable under
federal rules. The court in admitting this evidence cited several cases
wherein this procedure had been adopted and pointed out that this
evidence was not substantive to the extent that the ruling in the
Tompkins case required him to follow the state rule of evidence. The
court in reaching this decision apparently used the method of reasoning
and approach toward the problem outlined above. This is shown
by the court's statement that the doctrine of the Tompkins case was
not applicable because the rule of evidence involved there was not
substantive to such an extent as to come under that doctrine. The
test seems to be then: is the rule of admissability (or of exclusion)
of evidence or of the competency of witnesses of a substantive or
procedural nature. If the former, the Constitutional infirmity of the
Tompkins case applies, and the federal court must follow state law
on the matter.
It might be asked what would be the result of a situation where
none of the standards of 43(a) had ruled on a certain type of evidence.
That question involves a problem in the interpretation of 43(a) and
not of the effect of the Tompkins case. Once a determination had been
made the question would still be - has there been an invasion of
the substantive law in a subject entirely under state control.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 9 were adopted about
six years after the decision in the Tompkins case. These rules are
not affected by the Tompkins case. They are rules of procedure govern-
ing United States courts in conducting trials of cases arising under
the statutory law of the United States enacted by Congress persuant
to proper Constitutional authorization. These cases are in the same
category for our purposes as civil cases involving federal questions
and there can be no question of the Constitutional power of Congress
to authorize rules of procedure to guide the federal courts in dis-
patching these cases.
Section 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 0 deals with
the competency of witnesses and admissability of evidence and provides
that in the absence of federal statutes to the contrary "the principles
of the common law, as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience," shall apply. The
notes of the Advisory Committee on this section of the rules state
that the purpose of the section was to carry forward with the prin-
ciples of Funk v United Statese1 and Wolfle v United States. 22 These
cases indicate that in the absence of statutes, federal courts in criminal
19 Supra note (8).
20 Supra note (8).
2290 U.S. 371 (1933).
22291 U.S. 7 (1934).
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cases arenot bound by state laws of evidence but are guided by com-
mon law principles interpreted in the light of reason and experience.
The rule was intended to give the federal courts a flexibiilty in adopt-
ing the rules of evidence to meet changing conditions.
This rule differs from the rule governing the admissability of
evidence in civil cases in that this contemplates a uniform body of
law throughout the states while the rule in civil cases allows a partial
conformity to state law.
In summary, the effect of the Tompkins case on the admissability
of evidence and competency of witnesses is felt only in federal civil
cases where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, and there
only in so fat as the rules of evidence might be regarded as rules of
substantive law? 3
EDMUND W. POWE.L
231 have not discussed the effect of the Conformity Act (formerly 28 U.S.C.A.
section 724) because this section has been superseded the new rules and has
been omitted from the Code.
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